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GYPSY ALLEN CODIANNA,

'
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•

Case No 14248

Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a criminal proceeding brought by the State
of Utah against Gypsy Allen Codianna, defendant and appellant,
charging him with Criminal Homicide, to-wit; Murder in the First
Degree in violation of Title 76 Chapter 5 Section 202 (1) (d)
Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended*
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
In the District Court of the Seventh Judicial
District in and for Carbon County, State of Utah, on August 6,
1975, after a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of
First Degree Murder; the defendant elected to have the Court
impose the penalty, and on August 11, 1975 the Court sentenced
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the defendant to death by shooting on October 2, 1975.
Subsequently, on August 15, 1975 defendant filed with the
Trial Court a Notice and Motion for New Trial alleging that
the verdict was contrary to the evidence and that the Court
erred in questions of law arising during the course of the
trial and allowed an act prejudicial to the substantial rights
of the defendant.

The Motion was denied and overruled by the

Trial Court on September 8, 19 75.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an Order of this Court reversing
the judgment rendered at the trial and hearing on sentence, and
a ruling remanding the cause to the Trial Court for a new trial,
or in the alternative, an Order setting aside the sentence of
death and remanding the case to the Trial Court for the imposition of the sentence of life imprisonment,

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant, Gypsy Allen Codianna, was charged
in the information with one count of First Degree Murder for
the Murder of Michael Hoggan.

The trial began on August 4,1975

in the District Court for Carbon County before Seventh District
Judge Edward Sheya, and ended on August 11, 1975.

The appellant

was tried jointly with Irvin Paul Dunsdon and Craig Marvel who
were charged with the same offense as appellant.

••*' -'-.-:.
—
- 2 V
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The following evidence relative to the Appellant
was admitted at trial.
George Kouros and Tamara Dennis testified that
Appellant, Marvel and Dunsdon were present at a "keg" party
held at Tamara Dennis1 house in Price, Utah on the evening of
April 8, 1975. (T. 493, 509)

Kouras and Marvel testified that

Appellant was drinking beer, smoking marijuana, and taking
drugs. (T. 500, 524). Craig Marvel further testified that
Appellant arrived in Price about four days prior to the incident
and that Appellant never met the deceased. (T.523, 527)
Ralph Muncy testified that he and Michael Hogan
were awakened by a knock on the door of their residence in the
early morning of April9, 1975. (T. 407)
living room and opened the door (Tr.409)

Hogan proceeded to the
Muncy went to see

what was happening and saw the outline of four persons, including
Hogan, (T.411) one of whom was holding a rifle (T.412). Muncey
observed a struggle as he went back to the bedroom (T.419) and
shortly thereafter heard a shot (T.422) and a vehicle leave.
(T. 423)
Officer Norman Vuksinick testified that he received
a radio call at 12:28 A.M. on April 9, 1975 and responded by
proceeding to the deceased's residence.

He there examined what

appeared to be blood in the driveway and three empty .22 shell
casings. (T.68-69)
Trooper LeGrand Wilburg testified that he stopped
a 1955 or

f

56 light green pickup truck near the "Blue Cut" on

Highway 50-6 in the early morning hours on-April 9, 1975. (T.98,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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99)

Upon his request, Marvel, Dunsdon, and Codianna exited

from the truck, (T. 102)

He observed an enormous amount of

blood on Dunsdon, (T.102) blood on the front of Marvel (T.103)
but he observed no blood whatsoever upon the person of Codianna.
(T. 129)
Wilberg and Nordfelt testified that they proceeded
to Crandall Canyon area after taking the defendants into custody.
(T. 105,141)

After following some tire tracks for approximately

one-half mile (T. 191) up Crandall Canyon they came upon a
body which was later identified as Michael Hogan. (T.Ill, 143)
Dr. Serge Moore, the State Medical Examiner for the
State of Utah, testified that the death of Michael Hogan was
caused by multiple gun shot wounds to the body and manual strangulation. (T. 281)

He further testified that 13 projectiles

were removed from the body of the deceased. (T.289) and over the
objection of counsel testified that there were fifty contusions
on the body. (T. 282)
Richard E. Schmidt, a Special Agent with the F.B.I.,
testified that four bullets, Ex. 10, 15, 16, and 17 were fired
by the gun found in the pickup to the exclusion of any other
weapon.(T. 339)

Dr. Moore testified that Ex. 10, 15, 16 and 17

were removed from the body of Michael Hogan.(T. 271, 273, 277 )
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ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GOING INTO SESSION WHEN
THE DEFENDANT, GYPSY ALLEN CODIANNA, AND HIS ATTORNEY WERE
NOT PRESENT.
The Court went into session in chambers on August 4,
1975. (T. 37-51) Present were the Court, Counsel for the State,
Counsel for the defendant, Paul Dunsdon, and the Defendant, Paul
Dunsdon.

Conspicuously lacking was the presence of Appellant

and his attorney.

At that time a motion was made by Counsel for

the State to sever the trial of Mr. Dunsdon and continue with
the trial of defendants Codianna and Marvel. (T.38) Such a motion
and the accompanying statements of Counsel for the State set
forth below involved the question of guilt of Appellant, Gypsy
Allen Codianna, and were prejudicial toward him:
(T. 39)
MR. BOUTWELL: "The State is quite confident in
this case, However, the State also realizes that
there are some unusual relationships among the
Defendants. Mr. Dunsdon is relative a stranger
among their midst, and even though the State feels
that a conviction in the, perhaps Mr. Dunsdon may
have some mitigating evidence to put on that may
not convict him of the full charge. And the State
feels that the life sentence, five to life sentence
is a fair exchange for a more reinforced case."
(T. 42)
MR. BOUTWELL:" I think that there was a different
degree of participation, Your Honor, and I think
that it would come out in mitigating evidence in
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the hearing following the conviction on a
capital crime."...
THE COURT:"you are saying you think at the
second hearing this man would be shown to b e — "
MR. BOUTWELL; "Lesser involved..."
(T. 44)
MR. BOUTWELL: " Your Honor, there is one point
I would like to make which is very unusual in
this type of situation. The point is that Mr.
Dunsdon, I am informed, and I understand that
there is no evidence to the contrary, never met
the other two Defendants until that night and
just a matter of hours, however, before the
murder."
It is significant to note that neither the Appellant
nor his attorney had waived the right to be present at that
session of Court held in chambers.

In fact, neither Appellant

nor his attorney were aware that the Court went into session in
chambers without their presence until the receipt of the reporters transcript and the reading of the proceedings had at such
hearing.

Nor was any notice given that the Court was going to

go into session.
It has long been held that a defendant in the prosecution for a felony has the right to be personally present in
Court with his attorney at all stages of the proceedings.

The

Utah Supreme Court in State v. Myers 508 P.2d 41 (Utah 1973)
stated:
It has been said that the requirement of the presence of the defendant in Court at all states of
the trial proceeds on the presumption that he is
in custody and must be brought before the Court

-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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by the officer who detains him* It is a right
which belongs to every defendant. 508 P.2d at 42
The Court went on to hold that in "non-capital"
offenses a defendant may voluntarily waive the right to be
present.

This seems to suggest that in capital cases perhaps

a defendant cannot even waive the right to be present.

Justice

Crockett concurring implied that the state must show that the
defendant voluntarily waived the right to be present.
As a consequence, the Appellant was deprived of his
constitutional rights to appear and defend in person and by
counsel.

Such a deprivation is clearly in violation of Article I,

Sec. 12, Constitution of Utah, which provides:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel.
Section. 77-1-8 (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended
states:
In criminal prosecutions, the defendant is
entitled to appear and defend in person and
by counsel.
And at Sec.77-27-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953:
...if the prosecution for a felony, the
defendant must be personally present at the
trial.
In State v. Aikers, 51 P.2d 1052 (Utah 1935) the
Utah Supreme Court stated:
Where a defendant is in custody and therefore
not a free agent, the duty is on the Court to
see that he is personally present at every stage
of the trial... Proceedings had in the absence
of a defendant and without his knowledge or
consent, is ground for reversal. 51 P.2d at 1056

7 - J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It should be noted that Appellant throughout the
entire course of the trial was in custody and the Court therefore had the duty to see that defendant was present at every
stage of the trial.
The Court in Aikers / supra, further said:
The right to be present at all stages of the trial
is claimed to be of such an absolute character
that it cannot be waived either by counsel or the
defendant, and when the Court permits the trial
to proceed in the absence of the defendant, the
judgment of conviction must be set aside. There
is no doubt but that the constitutional right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel is a
sacred right of one accused of crime which may
not be denied by a court or be waived by counsel.
51 P.2d at 1055.
The Courts have also held that the failure of the
Court to have the defendant present at other critical stages of
the trial constitutes reversible error.

See Hopt v. People of

Terr, of Utah 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 286 Ed. 262 (1894).
United States v. Crutcher 405 F. 2d 239 (2d Cir. 1968) , Knight
v. State 273 Ala. 480, 142 So.2d 899 ( Ala.1962), State v.
Carver 94 Idaho 677, 496 P.2d 676 ( Ida. 1972).
The question remains whether the failure to obtain
the defendant's presence
trial proceeding

or at least to notify him of the

was so prejudicial as to warrant a reversal•

The Court in Carver stated:
The.ordinary test for determining if the constitutional error warrants a new trial is whether
it is harmless or prejudicial...Furthermore the
Court in Chapman v. United States made it clear
that there are errors affecting fundamental
constitutional rights "so basic to a fair trial
-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that their infraction can never be treated
as a harmless error." 496 P.2d at 679.
The Carver court quotes from a similar case in Michigan, People
v. Medcoff 344 Mich. 108, 73 N.W. 2d 537 (1955).

In that case

the defendant had been excluded from the courtroom during the
examination of the jurors concerning an alleged misconduct by
one of the jurors.

The court ordered a new trial and said that

what happened between the judge and the jury was not itself
prejudicial but these factors were immaterial.

The Court said:

The abrogation of defendants1 right to be present
is not determined from the result and review thereof of the court;s inquiry but rather from the mere
fact that during the injury defendants were not
given an opportunity to exercise those privileges
which their right to be present affords them. Where
such fundamental rights are denied, the guilt or
innocence of the accused is not concerned and
neither party is put to the burden of showing actual
injury or prejudice or lack of it. Injury is conclusively presumed. 73 N.S. 2d at 543
In the instant case, the Court was clearly not the
trier of fact as to the guilt or innocence of Appellant, but the
Court was the one the defendant chose to make the decision as to
whether the death penalty was imposed.

This made him the trier

of fact in that regard and any information that he was allowed
to hear should have been heard in the presence of the defendant
and his counsel.

The defendant should have been able to hear

the accusations made by Dunsdon, Counsel and the State, and been
given an equal opportunity to not only cross-examine him (Utah
Code Annotated,Section 77-1-8) but also the opportunity to
influence the judge vis-a-vis the Dunsdon testimony.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The

information exchanged between Dunsdon and the Court would
have had a bearing on the choice Codianna made as to whom
should impose the sentence and the type of testimony he would
have given the judge at the sentencing proceeding.
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POINT

II

APPELLANTS DEATH SENTENCE IMPOSED PURSUANT TO
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 76-3-206 and 207 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER
THE HOLDING OF FURMAN v.GEORGIA AND CONSTITUTES CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.
The United States Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 33 L.Ed. 2d 346, 92 S.Ct. 2726 (1972) held unconstitutional all death sentences imposed pursuant to any statutory
scheme that delegates to the judge or jury the discretion whether
or not to impose the death penalty upon conviction.

Accordingly,

death sentences in approximately 117 other capital cases, involving numerous differing death penalty statutes from 26 states,
including Utah, were summarily vacated simultaneously with
Furman

and upon its authority.

Utah's death penalty statute

in effect at that time was among those reviewed and held unconstitutional by the Court.

See Kelbach v. Utah 408 U.S. 935,

92 S.Ct. 2858. 33 L.Ed.2d 751 (1972). The Utah statute under
review, Utah Code Annotated 76-30-4 provided:
Every person
shall suffer
the jury may
State prison
Court.

guilty of murder in the first degree
death, or upon the recommendation of
be imprisoned at hard labor in the
for life, in the discretion of the

An analysis of that stutute would indicate that the jury in
determining whether to recommend life imprisonment would be
bound by no standards and the possibility of discrimination
and arbitrariness were unrestricted.
-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In an effort to rectify the shortcomings of the
unconstitutional statute, the Utah Legislature repealed Utah
Code Annotated 76-30-4 (Laws of Utah 1973, Chapter 196, Section
76-10-1401) and enacted Utah Code Annotated 76-3-206 and 207,
which provide for post-conviction proceedings before judge or
jury to determine whether the sentence shall be death or life
imprisonment in a case involving a capital felony.

The statute

attempts to proscribe the scope of evidence admissible at the
hearing by allowing evidence
"as to any matter the Court deems relevant to
sentence, including but not limited to the nature
and circumstances of the crime, the defendant's
character, background, history, mental and physical
condition, and any other facts in aggravation or
mitigation of the penalty. Any evidence the court
deems to have probative force may be received regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence. Utah Code Annotated 76-3-207.
The statute then continues to set forth circumstances
which shall be received in mitigation by the judge or jury:
(a) The defendant has no significant history or
prior criminal activity;
(b) The murder was committed while the defendant
was under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance;
(c) The defendant acted under extreme duress or
under the substantial domination of another person;
(d) At the time of the murder, the capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness)
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirement of law was substantially impaired as a
result of mental disease, intoxication, or influence
of drugs;
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(e) The youth of the defendant at the time of
the crime;
(f) The defendant was an accomplice in the murder
committed by another person and his participation
was relatively minor;
(.g). And any other fact in mitigation of the penalty.
Consideration of the new statute, 76-3-207, shows
that the defect of unfettered discretion which rendered the
former statute unconstitutional has not been cured.

The new

statute confers upon judge or jury the potential to implement
the same arbitrariness or discriminatory application inherent
in the former statute and which was repudiated in Furman.

The

discretion as to life or death after conviction still remains
with the judge or jury with no specific guidelines or standards
having been established to assist in that determination.

The

mitigating circumstances set forth in 76-^3-207 are suspect for
vagueness; (a) significant history, (b) extreme mental or emotional disturbances, (c) youth of the defendant, (g) and any other
fact in mitigation of the penalty.(emphasis added)

The statute

makes no attempt whatsoever to instruct as to the weight to be
given to each factor, nor does it necessarily list them in the
order of their importance.

The judge or jury can effectively

exclude any or all and still has the discretion as to the significance to be accorded each factor.
The statute is further repugnant for the reason
that the statute is worded so that evidence may be presented
as to any matter the Court deems relevant.

Thus, the discretion

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of the judge or jury has been once again expanded.
Since the judge or jury is not required under
76-3-207 to give any weight to any of the mitigating factors,
the potential to disregard them is ever present and in practicality means that no discernible standard exists to distinguish
the few cases in which death is imposed from the many in which
it is not.
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POINT III
THE SENTENCE

OF DEATH IMPOSED ON APPELLANT

CONSTITUTES CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNSIHMENT WITHIN THE MEANING
OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.
•••' The Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of the State of Utah both prohibit the infliction
of any punsihment which is cruel and unusual.

Appellant contends

that the death penalty is cruel and unusual in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and in violation of Article I,
Section 9, Constitution of Utah.

Although the United States has a history of capital
punishment the clear trend has unmistakably been toward its
abolition.

The last execution in the United States was in 1967

and constitutes the finale of a trend which has been going downward in civilized nations since 1935. (Furman, supra, Opinion of
Mr. Justice Marshall at 345). Clearly the concept of sanctions
to be imposed has substantially changed since the "cruel and
unusual11 clause was drafted.

Cruelty cannot be properly defined

in terms of the excesses present when it was inserted into the
Bill of Rights, but rather in terms of the contemporaneous
condition of society.

The United States Supreme Court in Weems

v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 30 S. Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910)
stated,
-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Legislation...should not, therefore, be
necessarily confined to the form that evil
had theretofore taken. Time works changes,
brings into existence new conditions and
purposes. Therefore, a principle to be vital
must be capable of wider application than the
mischief which gave its birth. 30 S. Ct. at 551.

-

The principle was further enunciated in Trop v.
Dulles 356 U.S. 86, 78 S. Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 596 (1958) when
the Supreme Court said,
The words of the (Eighth) Amendment are not
precise, and...their scope is not static.
The Amendment must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of discovery that make the
progress of a maturing society...The basic
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is
nothing less than the dignity of man. While
the State has the power to punish, the Amendment
stands to assure that this limit be exercised
within the limits of civilized standards.
356 U.S. 101 .
That society changes its standards goes without saying as evidenced by statutes restricting form of punishment, child labor,
slavery, treatment of the insane and cripples.

Conditions which

once constituted a part of every day life are now intolerable
in a civilized society.

Mr. Justice Marshall in Furman, supra,

concluded after an exhaustive treatment of the history and
purpose to be achieved by capital punishment, that the death
penalty
"is morally unacceptable to the people of the
United States at this time in their history."
408 U.S. at 360
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and at 371:

">'•'

In rejecting capital punishment...we achieve a
major milestone in the road up from barbarism
and join approximately 70 other jurisdictions
in the world which celebrate their regard for
civilization and humanity by shunning capital
punishment. 408 U.S. at 371
The infrequency with which the death penalty is

applied should by itself indicate that capital punishment offends
contemporary standards of decency.

The National Crime Commis-

sioner reported to the President that:
"The most salient characteristic of capital
punishment is that it is infrequently applied...
All available data indicate that judges, juries,
and governors are becoming increasingly reluctant
to impose, or authorize the carrying out of a
death sentence...In a few states in which the
penalty exists on the statute books, there has
not been an execution in decades. (Presidents
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice, Report (1967 (The Challenge of Crime
in a Free Society p. 143)
It is apparent that the continuous decline in the
number of executions demonstrate that capital punishment is
unacceptable to society today.

The inherent dignity of man

underlies our concept of society. Surely anything which undermines that dignity must be viewed as abhorrent to it.
The dehumanizing psychological effects of lengthly
imprisonment prior to execution, during which the judicial and
administrative processes take place, must be considered in the
cruelty of capital punishment.

The United States Supreme Court

in Weems, Supra, acknowledged that:
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...it must have come to (the framers of the
Eighth Amendment) that there could be exercises
of cruelty by laws other than those which
inflicted bodily pain or mutilation. 217 U.S.
at 372
And in Trop v. Dulles, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court considered
the psychological impact of the punishment of denationalization
to be a crucial fact in finding that the Eighth Amendment had
been violated;
There may be involved no physical mistreatment,
no primitive torture. There is instead the
total destruction of the individual's status
in organized society. 356 U.S. at 101
The mental torture of a condemmed man lies in the fact that
there is no escape.

It involves a punishment that has been

prepared with premeditation and careful planning.

The values

of humanity are cheapened by the act of the State and its
standards of decency and conscience are diminished.

Capital

punishment is therefore, cruel and unusual if measured by the
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 101.

B.
Capital punishment is cruel and unusual for the
reason that it fails to reach any legitimate object of the State
which could not be accomplished by less severe means.
Brennan in Furman, supra, stated;
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Mr. Justice

It is a denial of human dignity for the State
arbitrarily to subject a person to an unusually
severe punishment that society has indicated it
does not regard as acceptable, and that cannot
be shown to serve any penal purpose more effectively than a significantly less drastic punisment. Under these principles and this test,
death, is tody a cruel and unusual punishment.
408 U.S. at 286
Four

of the acknowledged purposes of punishment

are rehabilitation, retribution, isolation of the offender and
deterrence to crime.

The Supreme Court of California in People

v. Anderson, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880 (1972) in addressing itself to these purposes states that:
None of these purposes is shown to justify
so onerous a penalty as death. 493.P.2d at 896
See .Furman, supra, beginning at page 345 wherein
Mr. Justice Marshall discusses these objectives and then concludes by stating:
"There is but one conclusion that can be drawn
from all of this - i.e. the death penalty is
an excessive and unnecessary punishment that
violates the Eighth Amendment."
There is no question but what death extinguishes
any possibility of rehabilitation.

Mr. Justice Stewart in

Furman, supra stated:
" The penalty of death differs in all other forms
of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind.
It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation
of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal
justice, and it is unique, finally, in its absolute
renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept
of humanity. (Stewart 306)
Retribution or vengence in an enlightened society
ought not to be sanctioned as the sole reason for punishment.
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The Court in Anderson, supra said:
f . . it is incompatible with the dignity of
an enlightened society to attempt to justify
the taking of life for purposes of vengence.
493 P. 2d at 896

Surely less drastic means are available to isolate
the convicted criminal from society than death.

Life imprison-

ment, even though distateful to the convicted, accomplishes the
goal of isolation and protection of society and at the same time
comports with the dignity of man.

To say that isolation by

imprisonment is too expensive is to cheapen life and ignore the
fact that our penal institutions are partially filled with
persons serving

life sentences for less than capital crimes.

The deterent effect of the death penalty has not
been established as evidenced by recent studies.

(1967)

Chambliss, Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness of Legal
Sanctions, 1967 Wise. L.Rev. 703, 706. And a punishment as final
as death in all logic should not be based upon speculation as to
superiority of the deterrent value of death as opposed to less
severe forms of punishment.
By way of summary, justification for the infliction
of the death penalty cannot be supported in view of the alternative of less severe forms of punishments.

It is inconsistent

with any recognized purpose of punishment and is incompatible
with the dignity of man.
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POINT IV

THE APPELLANT'S DEATH SENTENCE V7HICH IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL SHOULD BE REVERSED AND UNDER AUTHORITY OF
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 76-3-207 (4) SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE
TRIAL COURT FOR THE IMPOSITION OF THE SENTENCE OF LIFE
IMPRISONMENT.
Recognizing that the trend is toward the abolition
of capital punishment, Utah Code Annotated 76-3-207 (4) provides
that in the event that the death penalty is held to be. unconstitutional by the Utah Supreme Court or the Supreme Court of
the United States, the defendant shall be brought before the
Court having jurisdiction and sentenced to life imprisonment.
Appellant contends that since the death penalty is unconstitutional his sentence should be reversed and remanded to the
trial court for the imposition of the sentence of life imprisonment.

-21-
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POINT

V

THE VERDICT OF GUILTY OF MURDER IN THE FIRST
DEGREE IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED
THEREON.
Appellant contends that the testimony and evidence
produced at trial relative to his participation in the death
of Michael Hogan are not sufficient to support a verdict of
Murder in the First Degree.

Appellant's Motion for New Trial

based thereon was denied and overruled by the trial court.
In

State v. Krummacher, 515 P.2d 412 (Or. 1973)

the Oregon Supreme Court set forth the test to be used in
determining whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
support a jury verdict of guilty;
«**** where the evidence is entirely circumstantial r would a reasonable person, based
upon all the evidence adduced in the case be
warranted in finding beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the offense charged.'"
515 P.2d at 416.
The evidence was that appellant had never met the
deceased and did not even know who he was f

(T . 558,523,527)

whereas Marvell was a room mate of the deceased at one time
(T. 528, 530) and Dunsdon stated that his intention was to
go over there and beat Hogan up. (T. 593,596), Dunsdon further
testified that at the party he and Marvell were the only ones
talking about Hogan. (T. 593)

Appellant might have been

listening, but only Marvell and Dunsdon were talking about it.
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(T. 59 3).

There exists no reason for Appellant to have

wanted to participate in the killing of Michael Hogan.

He

had no prior contact with him whatsoever and a motive for
Appellant to participate in the killing is totally absent.
After the three left the party they picked up a
weapon at the Alpine Motel at the request of Marvell (T. 584)
and proceeded to Hogan's home (T. 586). Hogan walked outside
with Dunsdon (T. 587) and fell down when a shot was fired.
(T. 588). The testimony does not indicate that Appellant was
involved at all in the event at the home of the deceased.
Dunsdon even testified that he and Marvell were the ones who
loaded the body into the truck to the exclusion of Appellant.
(T. 59 3)

Dunsdon1s testimony indicates that all of the shots

were fired by Marvell and that none were fired by Appellant
(T. 590, 603)
It appears also that the Court was concerned about
the lack of participation of Appellant, Codianna. (T. 601)

It

appears that his participation, if any, came solely in the form
that he had a gun. (T. 601)

The Court's questioning at page

604 is significant:
THE COURT:"Did he say anything that indicated
that he went along with the idea?"
A. "No, I don't believe he did that either.
Other than said it looked like he was moving
around in the back of the truck, so I stopped
and he was put up front."
~23-
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THE COURT:"But his main purpose in going with
you was to get his gun/"
A. "Yes"
It is significant that the arresting officers
observed no blood whatsoever on Appellant at the time of his
arrest, (T. 129, 214) whereas Marvel and Dunsdon had blood on
themselves. (T. 102, 103)

The FBI Agent did, however, testify

that there was one small spot of blood on the inside of
Appellant's trousers, Ex. 63, which was so small that it could
not be typed. ( T. 332)

Since the blood was so small and found

on the inside of the trousers, it is apparent that it was not
connected to the deceased.
There was no evidence

that Appellant intentionally

or knowingly caused the death of the deceased.

To the contrary,

the evidence as set forth above is that the killing was perpetrated by another who acted by himself and without Appellant
having any fore-knowledge of what was going to happen.

Applying

the test of Krummacher, supra, the evidence adduced in the case
would not warrant a reasonable person in finding beyond a
reasonable doubt that Appellant committed murder in the first
degree, and accordingly, the evidence is insufficient to sustain
a verdict of guilty.

-24Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J.
Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT VI
IN THE EVENT THE COURT DETERMINES THAT THE DEATH
PENALTY IS CONSTITUTIONAL, THE COURT ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION

UNDER UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 76-3-206 and 207 BY NOT SENTENCING
APPELLANT TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT, AND COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
Utah Code Annotated 76-3-206 and 207 vests judge or
jury with unfettered discretion to determine whether the penalty
in a capital case shall be death or life imprisonment.

The Court,

in sentencing Appellant to death, abused its discretion by
either disregarding the mitigating factors set forth in 76-3-207,
or by failing to give them any appreciable weight.

The mitigat-

ing factors so disregarded are as follows:
(d) At the time of the murder, the capacity of
the defendant to appreciate the criminality
(wrongrulness) of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirement of law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease,
intoxication, or influence of drugs;
The testimony was that Appellant had consumed considerable quantities of beer, Valium, and marijuana at the party
immediately prior to the murder (T. 500, 511, 524, 538) Appellant
testified that the combined effect of the drugs and alcohol was
to make him lose his memory, affect his vision, and caused him
to take a long time to make a decision. (T. 540)

Mr. Grant

Smith who was permitted to testify by the Court as an expert
stated that the judgmental capacity of a person who consumed
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the amounts testified to by Appellant would be impaired.
(T. 545}

Appellant specifically recalled in response to a

question from the Court that he couldn't see clearly ( T.571)
and was having difficulty hearing. ( T. 572)
(e) The youth of the defendant at the time
of the crime;
The testimony is that Appellant was 20 or 22 years
of age at the time of the crime.( T. 537, 552 ) Certainly the
young age of the Appellant should have received considerable
weight as affecting his judgmental maturity.
(f) The defendant was an accomplice in the murder
committed by another person and his participation
was relatively minor;
As set forth in Point V of this brief the participation of Appellant in the crime was relatively minor.

He

didn't know the deceased at all, and no reason to dislike the
deceased, and appears from all the testimony to have been only
along for a ride.

He didn't know where he was going when they

left the party, (. T, 559) didn't do the shooting, did not load
the deceased into the truck, gave no encouragement of the crime
(T. 604) , and had no blood on his person.

Compared to the con-

duct of Marvel and Dunsdon, the participation of Appellant was
very minor.

Appellant exercised no brutality whatsoever and

performed no direct act which contributed to the death of Michael
Hogan.

Certainly, Appellant's participation, which consisted
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only of being present when the crime was committed, was not
of sufficient magnitude to warrant the imposition of the death
penalty,
(g). Any other fact in mitigation of the penalty.
The background of Appellant is such that the Court .
should have considered it as a mitigating factor as to why
Appellant allowed himself to be placed in the circumstances
in which he found himself.
He was given away by his mother when he was nine
months old and from that point on never knew any of his
relatives. (T. 553)

He was raised by 25 foster homes, seven

boys homes, three juvenile halls, and the Job Corps. (T. 55 3)
Although he went through the 9th grade, he only achieved a
fourth grade reading and spelling level. (T. 554)

He has been

unable to obtain a drivers license or join the armed services
apparently because of difficulties in showing his legal age
and citizenship. ( T. 554)
Such a background is certainly not conducive to
developing the qualities which would be helpful in recognizing
and timely extricating oneself from involvement in potentially
unlawful activities.

No claim is made that such circumstances

should excuse antisocial behavior, but the obvious deprivations
of Appellant are entitled to be given considerable weight in
explaining why Appellant was present on the night of the crime.
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It appears from the record that the trial court
gave no weight to the above mitigating factors when in fact
their purpose in being placed in the statute was to have them
considered by the Court.

The Court at p. 650 of the transcript

stated that "if this is not a case warranting death...it is
hard to imagine a case that would warrant the death penalty."
But concomitantlyf in view of the age, background, limited
participation of the appellant and the presence of drugs and
alcohol, if Appellant's case is not a case warranting a lesser
penalty it is hard to imagine a case which is.
abused its discretion by failing to give to

The Court

the mitigating

factors the weight to which they were justly entitled and which
would have demanded imposition of life imprisonment instead of
death.

-28-
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POINT VII
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS VOIR DIRE OF THE
PROSPECTIVE JURORS AND COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY ,
(A) INSTRUCTING THEM THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO DETERMINE THE
PENALTY WHEN IN FACT UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 76-3-206 PROVIDES
THAT THE COURT CAN ALSO DETERMINE THE PENALTY; (B) INSTRUCTING THE JURORS AS FOLLOWS: "LETS MAKE IT APPLY TO THIS CASE,
AND SAY THESE DEFENDANTS ARE GUILTY OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER".
A.
The court instructed the prospective jurors as
follows:
Then there is a hearing by the same jury that
tried the case to determine what the punishment
should be. Whether it sould be death or life
imprisonment. (T. 13)
...under the law of this state a death penalty
can and would be imposed only if the jurors
unanimously agree that the death sentence should
be imposed. (T. 13)
In other words, under present Utah law a death
penalty can be imposed in a first degree murder
conviction only if the jury unanimously agrees
that that penalty shall be imposed. (T. 14)
Utah Code Annotated 76-3-207 (1) specifically
provides that the hearing on the sentence after a verdict of
guilty to a capital felony has been rendered, shall be heard
by judge or jury at the election of the defendant:
When a defendant has been found guilty of a
capital felony, there shall be.further proceedings before the court or jury on the issue
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of penalty. The proceedings shall be
conducted before the court or jury which
found the defendant guilty, provided the
defendant may waive hearing before the
jury, in which event the hearing shall be
before the court.
By incorrectly, albeit unintentional, stating
that the jury would absolutely be the one body to impose the
penalty, the court was inducing those prospective jurors who
might have had scruples against the death penalty to remove
themselves so that they would not have to make the penalty
choice.

Had they been instructed that the defendant had the

choice of electing the judge or jury to impose the penalty the
make up of the jury might have been materially altered.

Those

jurors who were excused might have answered differently the
questions propounded to them by the Court concerning their death
penalty

attitudes and biases.

Admittedly, there is no evidence

in the record to substantiate the assertion that the excused
jurors might have responded differently, but in a capital
case where the penalty is so irrevocable the court should
exercise extreme caution in safeguarding the rights of the
accused. In State y, Belwood, 27 Utah 2d 214, 494 P. 2d 519
(Utah 1972) Justice Crockett in his concuring opinion states:
Where the life of a human being is in hazard,
it is incumbent as a part of human decency
and good conscience to be extremely cautious
in making sure that the rights of the accused
have been safeguarded to the end that he has
a fair trial by an impartial court and jury.
494 P. 2d at 522
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•

B . . : •

The court in its voir dire of the prospective
jurors stated:
,,.letls make it apply to this case, and say
these defendants guilty of first degree murder.
(T. 151
By presupposing the guilt of the Appellant the
court irrevocably fixed the notion in the mind of the jurors
that they were to return a verdict of guilty, and by so doing
substantially prejudiced Appellant's right to receive a fair
trial*
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POINT VIII
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS VOIR DIRE OF THE
PROSPECTIVE JURORS AND COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SEAT A NEW PANEL.
As examination of the court's voir dire would
indicate that the jurors could possibly, as stated in the
concurring opinion of Justice Crockett, in Belwood, supra,
"have gained the impression that in order to be qualified
as jurors they should be of such frame of mind that if they
found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree they
ought to impose the death penalty,"

Consider the testimony

of Mr. Christensen at T. 22 when he replaced a juror who was
excused:
THE COURT: And would you tell the Court
whether your answers to those questions
would be the same or would differ from the
other jurors?
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Mine differ.

THE COURT: And in what respect?
MR CHRISTENSEN: If they are found guilty by
the evidence I believe in capital punishment.
So I could vote.
Attention is also called to the questioning of
prospective juror,Lydia Palacios, who stated that she didn' t
think that she could under any circumstances vote for capital
punishment.

Continual questioning by the court finally induced

her to state that she couldn't vote for capital punishment, and
as a result was excused. (T. 18)

-32-
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Mrs. Alda Alger stated "I don't believe that I could"(T.20-21)
The court in pursuing the line of questioning it did when both
stated didn't believe or didn't think could not

have helped

but create in the minds of the jury the need for them to be
death oriented.

This violates the rule set forth in Belwood

where the majority opinion stated:
The State is not entitled to have a panel
of jurors comprised of only those members
of the community who are in favor of the
death penalty in capital cases. 494 P.2d
at 521 See also Witherspoon v. Illinois
391 U.S. 510 (1968)
The court also erred in failing to inquire of
jurors who evidenced no objection to the death penalty whether
they had an unwavering death penalty bias.

A death oriented

jury was therefore empaneled and was not representative of a
cross section of the community.

Appellant,recognizing that

the jury was death oriented, had no logical choice but to elect
the sentence to be imposed by the court, and whose death penalty
bias was unknown to the Appellant.

Note objections by counsel

at pages 17, 19,21, and 28.
Witherspoon, supra, in essence held that prospective
jurors who could under no circumstances impose the death penalty
could be excused by the Court.

At the other end of the spectrum

it would be more reprehensible for the Court to fail to excuse a
prospective juror who is absolutely death oriented, i.e., would
automatically vote to impose the death penalty upon conviction.
The testimony of Mr. Christensen (T. 32) indicated that such was
his position.
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CONCLUSION

The Appellant respectfully submits that the Trial
Court committed reversible error as set forth in Points I, V,
VI, VII, and VIII, and that the death penalty is unconstitutional as more fully set forth in Points II, III, and IV of the
foregoing Brief.

The Judgment rendered at trial should be re-

versed and the matter remanded to the Trial Court for a new
trial, or in the alternative, an Order should be issued setting
aside the sentence of death and remanding the cause to the
Trial Court for the imposition of the sentence of life imprisonment*
Respectfully submitted,

Bryrfe/K. Bryner
155 ^So. Main
Helper, Utah 84526
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